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Abstract Medical interventions such as methadone
treatment for drug addicts or Bchemical castration^ for
sex offenders have been used in several jurisdictions
alongside or as an alternative to traditional punishments,
such as incarceration. As our understanding of the bio-
logical basis for human behaviour develops, our crimi-
nal justice system may make increasing use of such
medical techniques and may become less reliant on
incarceration. Academic debate on this topic has largely
focused on whether offenders can validly consent to
medical interventions, given the coercive environment
of the criminal justice system. Both sides in this debate
share the assumption that administering medical inter-
ventions to offenders without their valid consent would
be unethical. Recently, Thomas Douglas has mounted a
formidable challenge to this Bconsent requirement^. Es-
sentially, his argument rests on a comparison between
prison and medical interventions. Douglas asks: if the
state is entitled to impose a prison sentence on a criminal
without the criminal’s consent, why is consent required
for the imposition of a medical intervention? The most
obvious way of defending the consent requirement
against Douglas’s challenge appeals to the fact that
incarceration merely interferes with the right to free
movement, but medical interventions interfere with the
right to bodily integrity. This argument rests on what
Douglas calls the Brobustness claim^—the claim that the
right to bodily integrity is more robust than the right to
freedom of movement. In other words, the right to
freedom of movement loses its protective force in a
wider range of circumstances than the right to bodily
integrity. Douglas’s article seeks to undermine the ro-
bustness claim, by arguing that neither case-based intu-
itions, nor theoretical considerations support this claim.
In this article, I will attempt to raise some doubts about
Douglas’s challenge to the consent requirement and the
robustness claim.
Keywords Moral enhancement . Neuroenhancement .
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Introduction
Medical interventions such as methadone treatment for
drug addicts or Bchemical castration^ for sex offenders
have been used in several jurisdictions alongside or as
an alternative to traditional punishments, such as incar-
ceration. As our understanding of the biological basis
for human behaviour develops, our criminal justice sys-
tem may make increasing use of such medical tech-
niques and may become less reliant on incarceration.
This topic has great practical and current significance
across jurisdictions. The Lord Justice Clerk, Lord
Carloway, has recently stated that the Scottish criminal
justice system should explore greater use of alternatives
to prison [1]. Prison is phenomenally expensive. It costs
£40,000 to keep a single inmate in prison in the UK for
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a boy at Eton College for the same period. In the United
States, the MacArthur Foundation has made $75 million
available for research and interventions relevant to re-
ducing the prison population (http://www.macfound.
org/press/press-releases/macarthur-launches-75m-
initiative-reduce-americas-use-jails/). Approaches to
criminal behaviour that could effectively rehabilitate
offenders—such as medical interventions to reduce
aggression—could spare offenders and potential
victims suffering and generate economic savings. This
economic benefit would be ethically desirable if the
money were used to promote citizens’ welfare, e.g. if
it were invested in further crime prevention measures.
However, the use of medical interventions to rehabilitate
offenders is likely to be opposed if they are thought to
violate offenders’ rights.
Academic debate on this topic has largely focused on
whether offenders can validly consent to medical inter-
ventions, given the coercive environment of the criminal
justice system. Both sides in this debate share the as-
sumption that administering medical interventions to
offenders without their valid consent would be unethical
[3, 4]. Recently, Thomas Douglas has mounted a formi-
dable challenge to this Bconsent requirement^ [5] :104].
Since support for the consent requirement is so wide-
spread, if Douglas’s challenge succeeds, this would
have major implications for thinking on this topic. Es-
sentially, his argument rests on a comparison between
prison and medical interventions. Douglas asks: if the
state is entitled to impose a prison sentence on a criminal
without the criminal’s consent, why is consent required
for the imposition of a medical intervention?
Some theorists might question the premise that man-
datory imprisonment is legitimate, given that the harsh
conditions prevalent in many of today’s prisons pose
serious risks to offenders’ physical and mental health
(cf. Barn, this volume). To address this concern, Doug-
las adds the qualification that, for the purpose of his
comparison, he is envisaging a type of incarceration that
restricts free movement and association but otherwise
poses no health risks. He calls this Bminimal incarcera-
tion^ [v:105]. He also stipulates for the sake of simplic-
ity that the medical intervention being considered is the
injection of a drug [v:106]. Another initial objection
against Douglas’s comparison is that imprisonment
and medical interventions are imposed for different
reasons. The aim of prison may be retribution, whereas
it is generally believed that the goal of medical inter-
ventions is rehabilitation. However, Douglas notes that
many theorists would accept that rehabilitation is also a
goal of imprisonment [v:106]. His argument is ad-
dressed to those theorists. So Douglas’s question,
framed more precisely is: if the goal of rehabilitation
justifies mandatory minimal incarceration, why does it
not also justify the mandatory injection of a drug?
The most obvious way of defending the consent
requirement against Douglas’s challenge appeals to the
fact that incarceration merely interferes with the right to
free movement, but medical interventions interfere with
the right to bodily integrity.1 This argument rests on
what Douglas calls the Brobustness claim^—the claim
that the right to bodily integrity is more robust than the
right to freedom of movement [v:110]. In other words,
the right to freedom of movement loses its protective
force in a wider range of circumstances than the right to
bodily integrity. Douglas’s article seeks to undermine
the robustness claim, by arguing that neither case-based
intuitions, nor theoretical considerations support this
claim.
In this article, I will attempt to raise some doubts
about Douglas’s challenge to the consent requirement
and the robustness claim.
Case-Based Intuitions
Our intuitive reactions to the scenario under discus-
sion—mandatory injection of prisoners—are unlikely
to take us very far. Claiming that this practice is intui-
tively unacceptable will lack Bdialectic force^ against
proponents of mandatory interventions [v:111]. Douglas
also casts doubt on the reliability of such intuitions—
they may just reflect wariness about the unfamiliar.
Although we are accustomed to the idea of employing
injections to treat/prevent illnesses, we are relatively
unfamiliar with the idea of using them to address crim-
inal behaviour. Perhaps mandatory imprisonment feels
more acceptable than mandatory medical interventions
merely because prison is a Btraditional^ response to
offending. Therefore, he proposes getting an indirect
bearing on the issue, by examining our intuitive reac-
tions to analogous cases that still involve comparing the
robustness of rights to free movement and bodily
1 The right to mental integrity might be thought to be equally or
more important in this context, since injecting offenders with
drugs for rehabilitative purposes would affect their minds. How-
ever, few researchers have explored the scope and implications of
this right. See e.g. [17].
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integrity, but that do not raise the above-mentioned
problems. He compares the following cases [v:112]:
Epidemic Scenario
Case 1 Imposing mandatory quarantine for three
months is the only way to prevent Jill, who has a highly
dangerous infectious disease, from starting an epidemic.
This would infringe her right to freedom of movement.
Case 2 Injecting Jane with a drug that renders her non-
infectious (but does not treat her illness) is the only way
to prevent the epidemic. This would infringe her right to
bodily integrity.
According to Douglas, this scenario seems to undermine
the robustness claim, as interfering with Jane’s right to
bodily integrity (in Case 2) seems just as permissible as
interfering with Jill’s right to freedom of movement (in
Case 1). However, there are two ways in which our
reactions to these cases may not be relevant to assessing
the robustness claim in the context of addressing crim-
inal behaviour.
Firstly, the example involves an emergency situation
and our intuitions about what should be done in emer-
gency situations may not be a good guide to how social
institutions (such as the criminal justice system) should
be regulated in ordinary circumstances. Emergencies are
typically time-limited and involve such a grave threat to
the existence or functioning of society that normal moral
principles and rights may need to be temporarily
suspended. For instance, emergencies can justify martial
law, which is not normally acceptable. In contrast, (even
serious) criminal behaviour is probably an inevitable
feature of society under normal conditions. Further-
more, emergencies typically require the state to act
quickly in order to avert an imminent danger, whereas
a criminal who is awaiting punishment does not pose an
immediate threat and the state has more time to deliber-
ate. Therefore, our intuition that an individual’s right to
bodily integrity should be infringed in exceptional cir-
cumstances to avert a catastrophe does not necessarily
tell us what protection should be afforded to this right in
the day-to-day running of the criminal justice system.
Secondly, Douglas’s way of framing the scenarios
does not allow us accurately to assess the relative ro-
bustness of the right to free movement compared with
the right to bodily integrity. Both of his hypothetical
cases involve a choice between only two options. In
case 1 the options are: a) allow the epidemic to occur
or b) interfere with the right to free movement. In case 2
the options are a) allow the epidemic to occur or b)
interfere with the right to bodily integrity. However, just
because both the right to free movement and the right to
bodily integrity can be overridden by an extremely
serious countervailing consideration (such as the need
to prevent an epidemic) does not show how easy it is to
override the right to free movement relative to the right
to bodily integrity. Consider the following analogy:
knowing that Charles is much taller than both Bob and
Andrew, does not allow you to compare the relative
height of Bob and Andrew.
It is also worth noting that, when it comes to the topic
at issue—administering medical interventions to pris-
oners—the state has more than two options [6]. It could
impose no punishment, impose a Btraditional^ punish-
ment such as prison or administer a medical interven-
tion.2 The state’s position is therefore more analogous to
the two scenarios that I will outline below than Doug-
las’s epidemic scenario, which involves a stark choice
between doing nothing to avert a negative outcome and
infringing bodily integrity.
A type of scenario with a better chance of generating
intuitions that are relevant to the robustness claim would
have the following characteristics. It involves a threat
that did not amount to an emergency, where three op-
tions were available: 1) doing nothing to avert a threat,
2) averting the threat by infringing the right to bodily
integrity and 3) averting the threat by infringing the right
to free movement. If option 3 would be preferable to
option 2, this would provide support fort the robustness
claim. Here is one such example:
Discipline Scenario
The parents of Anne, who is 11 years old, discover that
she is engaging in highly risky behaviour. Assume that
there are two forms of discipline that are likely to
2 The state may also have the option of allowing the offender to
choose between incarceration and a medical intervention. Argu-
ably, this option might be the most desirable one, all things
considered [8]. Douglas himself seems open to this possibility,
[7] 120. However, I do not discuss this option here, as my aim is to
reply specifically to Douglas’s suggestion that if the state is entitled
to impose mandatory incarceration on criminals without offering
medical interventions as an optional alternative (and most punish-
ment theorists assume it is entitled to do this), then the state is also
is entitled to imposemandatory medical interventions on criminals
without offering incarceration as an optional alternative.
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prevent Anne from continuing to take these risks—
grounding her or administering corporal punishment—
and that they will probably be equally effective. Which
option is preferable?
1. Allow Anne to engage in highly risky behaviour
without any interference.
2. Ground Anne (i.e. interfere with free movement).
3. Administer corporal punishment to Anne (i.e. inter-
fere with bodily integrity).
Arguably, grounding is the best option, corporal pun-
ishment the next best and doing nothing the worst
option. A plausible explanation for this intuition is that
interfering with free movement is preferable to interfer-
ing with bodily integrity. It might be objected that there
are alternative explanations for the intuitive response to
this case. For instance, it might be thought that corporal
punishment would inflict more distress than grounding.
However, that explanation is not convincing. Anne
might well find grounding more distressing than corpo-
ral punishment, e.g. if being grounded meant she would
miss her friend’s birthday party. Another competing
explanation for our intuitive preference for grounding
is that people might reject the stipulation that corporal
punishment is effective. Yet, even if this is one consid-
eration that counts against corporal punishment, the idea
that infringing bodily integrity is more disrespectful than
interfering with free movement is arguably a more im-
portant consideration [7]. In support of this point one
might consider the fact that corporal punishment of adult
criminals, e.g. flogging, was rejected not merely on the
basis that it is ineffective. (It is not clear that our current
practices—e.g. prison, are much more effective in re-
ducing reoffending. Nor is it clear, to return to the
previous objection, that flogging would necessarily be
more distressing than a long prison term.) A more
compelling reason for rejecting corporal punishment is
that interfering with bodily integrity is more disrespect-
ful than interfering with freedom of movement and
therefore that the right to bodily integrity is more robust
than the right to free movement.
The abandonment of corporal punishment of adults
(and the growing opposition to the corporal punishment
of children) is particularly relevant to the question at
issue—the acceptability of the mandatory injection of
prisoners. Douglas claims that opposition to such injec-
tions may be based on unreliable intuitions that are
simply the result of our unfamiliarity with this method
of responding to criminal behavior. However, society is
familiar with the more general issue of responding to
misconduct of adults and children by interfering with
their bodily integrity through corporal punishment, so
our intuitions about that matter are more likely to be
reliable. Intuitions about corporal punishment seem to
lend support to the idea that the right to bodily integrity
is more robust than the right to freedom of movement.
Therefore, these intuitions provide some indirect sup-
port for the claim that acknowledging the state’s right to
imprison offenders on a mandatory basis (i.e. to infringe
free movement) does not entail that the state also has the
right to administer injections to prisoners on a manda-
tory basis (i.e. to interfere with bodily integrity).
The discipline scenario is not the only thought ex-
periment that lends support to the robustness claim.
Consider the following scenario:
Driving Scenario
Joe has a medical condition that causes him unpredict-
ably to lose consciousness while driving. He lives in an
isolated cottage in a remote area and relies on his car to
meet friends and participate in activities he enjoys (al-
though he does have access to medical and emergency
services and can get food delivered etc. without his car).
Imagine that the authorities only have the following
three options. Which option is preferable?
1. Allow Joe to put other road users at risk, without
any interference.
2. Compel Joe to stop driving.
3. Forcibly inject Joe with a drug that does not treat his
underlying illness, but does prevent him from losing
consciousness for the duration of his car journeys.
It seems that, all other things being equal, it would be
preferable for the authorities to compel Joe to stop
driving than for them to forcibly inject him. A plausible
explanation for this intuition is that interfering with free
movement is preferable to interfering with bodily integ-
rity. It is unlikely that intuitive opposition to option 3 is
merely the result of unfamiliarity with the practice of
injecting people in such circumstances. We are, after all,
familiar with the general issue of using injections to
alleviate medical symptoms. Alternatively, it might be
objected that society’s attitude towards compulsory in-
jections is not as clear-cut as the above scenario
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suggests. There are some professions, e.g. health
workers, where injections are required as part of the
job [v:115]. However, such examples are quite rare
and consent to the injections is, in fact, given at the
stage when the health worker agrees to the terms of
the employment contract. Also, unlike the issue of
injecting criminals, the party offering the injection has
only two feasible options: allow the health worker to put
patients at risk or make vaccination a requirement of the
job. Whereas, in the criminal justice context, the state
has at least three options: imposing a traditional punish-
ment, a medical intervention or no punishment at all.
Furthermore, the health worker still has a choice: she
could choose another job. However, Douglas’s argu-
ment suggests that prisoners should be deprived of any
choice in the matter—mandatory injections would mean
that the offender could not even opt to stay in prison as
an alternative. Young children may be given injections
without their consent [v:115]. However, this is
disanalogous to the criminal justice situation for at least
two reasons. Firstly, children are given injections for
their own benefit, whereas the main purpose of injecting
offenders is to benefit others.3 Secondly, children may
lack the cognitive abilities and life experience to be able
to judge for themselves what is in their own best inter-
ests, whereas offenders are autonomous adults who
possess the relevant abilities and life experience.
Another example Douglas offers in defence of his
position is the forcible injection of mentally disordered
individuals who pose a danger to themselves or others,
but nevertheless have sufficient mental capacities to be
competent to refuse or grant consent [v:113].4 He points
out that in many jurisdictions the legal requirements that
must be satisfied before such a person may be forcibly
injected are no more onerous than the preconditions for
interfering with the person’s freedom of movement [8].
Admittedly, this is a particularly challenging case for the
defender of the robustness claim. My earlier criticisms
of the epidemic scenario (the availability of only two
options and the exceptional nature of the scenario) do
not apply to Douglas’s mental disorder example. The
state generally does have more than two options when
dealing with dangerous mentally ill individuals: inac-
tion, compulsory drug treatment, or compulsory deten-
tion. Furthermore, responding to severe mental illness is
a problem that society must face under normal condi-
tions—it is not an exceptional, emergency scenario.
However, the mental disorder example may face diffi-
culties of its own. Two possible strategies could be
adopted to defend the robustness claim against this
example. The first strategy is to deny that our current
practices regarding the mentally ill are justified. The
second strategy is to defend our current practices, but
to distinguish them from the compulsory injection of
sane offenders.
A proponent of the first strategy might point out that
society has traditionally taken an excessively paternal-
istic attitude towards people with mental disorders. It
has been slow to recognize that mental disorder need not
preclude the ability to make autonomous decisions
about one’s own treatment. Excessive paternalism to-
wards people with mental disorders could explain why
society has, on the one hand, been willing to disregard a
competent mentally ill person’s preference for physical
detention over drug treatment; while, on the other hand,
society has generally been unwilling to countenance
depriving sane, autonomous offenders of this choice.
However, those who value the right to bodily integrity
should be troubled by the fact that a genuinely compe-
tent person’s preference for physical detention over drug
treatment can be ignored simply because this person
suffers from episodes of mental illness. Furthermore,
disregard for the individual’s preference is particularly
troubling if a reasonable case can be made for the
preference. If indeed it is unjustifiably paternalistic forc-
ibly to inject competent people who suffer from mental
illnesses, despite their preference for detention, then our
misguided acceptance of this practice cannot be used to
justify forcible injection of sane offenders.
Turning to the second strategy, our current practice of
forcibly treating certain severely mentally ill individ-
uals, regardless of their apparent competence to refuse
consent, might be justified on epistemic grounds. In a
situation where we must weigh the individual’s best
interests (and also potentially the interests of others)
against the value of respecting the individual’s choices,
and where there is uncertainty about whether that choice
is really autonomous, the balance might tip in favour of
promoting best interests. If drug treatment is a)
3 Another reason for vaccination to is to promote heard immunity.
However, vaccination is almost always also in the best interests of
the particular child. It would be more controversial to compel
parents to vaccinate their children purely to benefit others.
4 Jurisdictions vary in how they deal with this issue. In England
andWales competent mentally ill individuals who refuse treatment
may still be treated in some circumstances, according to theMental
Health Act 1983, s3. This is also the case in several other com-
monwealth jurisdictions [10].
The Right to Bodily Integrity and the Rehabilitation of Offenders
indisputably in the individual’s best interests and b) we
know that the individual suffers from a severe mental
illness, we might doubt whether that individual is gen-
uinely competent to refuse treatment (even during pe-
riods of apparent lucidity). It might be thought that the
very nature of the situation just described necessarily
gives rise to at least some doubt about the individual’s
competence to refuse treatment. If this is correct, and if
this degree of doubt about competence would tilt the
balance in favour of the best interests considerations,
this could explain why the law disregards the refusal of
consent in this situation. The more confident we can be
that an individual is competent to refuse treatment, the
weaker are the paternalistic arguments for imposing
mandatory treatment on that individual. This strategy
would allow the case of mentally ill patients to be
distinguished from the case of sane offenders on the
basis that there is less reason to doubt that the latter are
competent to refuse treatment.
These strategies are mutually supportive. The most
plausible criticism of the first strategy is probably the
idea that a mentally ill person who is a danger to herself
or others should not be permitted to opt for detention
over treatment if treatment is indisputably in that per-
son’s best interests. However, the more one is convinced
that refusing treatment in a given situation would be
wholly unreasonable, the more plausible the second
strategy becomes, i.e. the more grounds there are for
doubting that the individual genuinely is competent.
A third strategy could also be adopted that involves
distinguishing mentally ill people from sane offenders
on the basis that treatment of the former is intended to
restore their rationality, [9, 10] whereas sane offenders
are already rational and treating them is intended to
improve their moral motivation. The right to bodily
integrity implies that individuals’ autonomous refusal
of treatment should be respected. However, if a mentally
ill person’s refusal of treatment would mean that in the
future she will become non-rational and non-autono-
mous, then arguably it shows greater respect for her
autonomy to impose treatment. 5 In contrast, the same
argument could not be made for imposing mandatory
moral enhancement on offenders unless one adopts the
controversial meta-ethical position that immorality is a
kind of irrationality. Indeed, many crimes could actually
be considered rational in the sense of maximizing the
preferences of the criminal. Also, mentally ill people
could be distinguished from sane offenders on the basis
that interference with the liberty of the former is justified
for paternalistic reasons (i.e. to safeguard the interests of
the person treated), whereas punishment might have a
different justification (e.g. to promote the interests of
society). It should also be emphasized that paternalistic
arguments are rarely considered capable of justifying the
mandatory treatment of competent individuals and
could only do so in exceptional circumstances and for
limited periods of time.
To summarise: this section critiqued two examples
advanced by Douglas—the epidemic scenario and the
compulsory treatment of the mentally ill. These cases
purport to undermine the robustness claim—the idea
that the right to bodily integrity is more robust than
freedom of movement. This, in turn, supposedly under-
mines the Bconsent requirement^—our current practice
of requiring consent for the administration of medical
treatment (despite our willingness to impose mandatory
incarceration on offenders). I have argued that these
examples do not necessarily undermine the robustness
claim or the consent requirement. I have offered two
examples of my own—the discipline scenario and the
driving scenario that seem to generate intuitions that
support the robustness claim and that provide indirect
support for the consent requirement.
Theoretical Considerations
As well as discussing case-based intuitions, Douglas
responds to some more theoretical arguments that might
be advanced in support of the claim that the right to
bodily integrity is more robust than the right to free
movement. He anticipates that defenders of the robust-
ness claim will point out that certain rights do seem
more robust than the right to free movement. For in-
stance, rights against killing, torture and public humili-
ation seem particularly robust. Douglas therefore con-
siders whether the considerations that underpin these
seemingly robust rights also underpin the right to bodily
integrity. He discusses two considerations - harm and
threats to agency.
5 This argument does not imply that it is generally permissible to
override present autonomy to enhance future autonomy. Rather,
the argument states that in these particular circumstances, where
autonomy must be infringed in some way (either by a mandatory
injection or by detention) in order to avert an immediate threat, it
may be best to implement the option that will prevent the capacity
for rational thought from being lost.
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Harm
I do not claim that the special robustness of the bodily
integrity rests primarily on the idea that infringements of
this right (e.g. through compulsory injections) are especial-
ly harmful. This is an empirical question, which we do not
have enough data to answer. However, I will attempt to cast
doubt onDouglas’s arguments that compulsory injection of
prisoners is unlikely to cause especially serious harm.
Douglas claims it is doubtful that compulsory injec-
tions of prisoners would be experienced in seriously
negative ways, since healthcare workers and children
do not find their experience of compulsory (or strongly
encouraged) vaccination an extremely negative experi-
ence [v:115]. However, there are reasons for thinking
that prisoners might experience these injections differ-
ently from children or healthcare workers. As, noted
above the injection of healthcare workers is not truly
compulsory (in the way that injection of offenders
would be under Douglas’s proposal) as healthcare
workers could always choose another job.6 The injec-
tion of young children can be compulsory, but it is
plausible that adults might react differently to compul-
sory injections. Adults have grown to expect that they
will have control over their own bodies and often find it
highly distressing to be treated like children. In addition,
vaccination of children and healthcare workers is
intended to prevent physical illnesses. The thought that
the injection is for one’s own physical welfare might
reduce the distress of the procedure. In contrast, the aim
of injecting offenders is to affect their future decisions
and moral motivation, mainly in order to benefit others.
The offender is likely to doubt whether the injection will
promote his own welfare. Furthermore, the thought of
being forcibly injected with a chemical that alters one’s
motivations in a way that bypasses ones rational facul-
ties could be particularly distressing [11].7
A closer analogy is the example, discussed
above, involving the compulsory injection with a
mind-altering drug of a mentally ill person who is
a danger to herself or others. However, this exam-
ple tends to support the proposition that such
injections are particularly distressing and that we
should not deprive the individual of the option of
detention. Empirical research suggests that, Bmost
patients who had experienced some form of be-
havioural control clearly preferred the use of se-
clusion or physical restraint to being forced to take
medication. Moreover patients’ opinions were
established when they were in remission from the
mental disturbance that had led to their confine-
ment so their views were not clouded by psychotic
symptoms or emotional arousal^ [12] :146, citing
[13].
Threats to Agency
Douglas distinguishes between two ways in which
interfering with bodily integrity might be thought
to threaten agency. Because the mind is Bdepen-
dent on and influenced by the body^ interfering
with the body might pose a Bcausal^ threat to
agency by impairing the capacities required for
agency [v:116]. Alternatively, interfering with B’s
bodily integrity might pose a Bcommunicative^
threat to agency by expressing Bthe proposition
that B is not an agent, or at least, that A does
not care whether B is an agent or not^ [v:116].
According to Douglas, it is plausible that torture,
killing and public humiliation threaten agency to a
greater extent than incarceration (i.e. interfering
with free movement). This could explain why the
rights that protect against such torture, killing and
public humiliation are more robust than the right
to free movement. However, he questions whether
forcibly injecting prisoners would threaten agency
more than imprisonment would.
I agree with Douglas that injecting offenders with a
drug designed to rehabilitate them need not necessarily
pose a causal threat to agency. It might happen to
undermine agency, depending on how the drug operated
[14]. If, for example, the drug instilled in offenders a
fear of reoffending that was so powerful that they were
unable to choose to reoffend then this might restrict their
agency. However, if it merely altered the offender’s
preferences regarding reoffending so that they more
6 Healthcare workers also freely decide to join their profession
knowing that vaccinations will be required. It might be argued that,
if compulsory injection of offenders with morally enhancing drugs
became accepted practice, individuals who chose to commit
crimes would do so in the knowledge that they could face injec-
tions if caught. However, they would presumably offend in the
belief that they would not be caught and so knowing in advance
that they might be injected with these drugs would not significant-
ly reduce the distress of the procedure.
7 Focquae r t and Schermer a rgue tha t compulso ry
neurointerventions are ethically troubling, because these interven-
tions are more likely than minimal incarceration to bypass of-
fenders’ rational faculties [12].
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closely resembled the preferences of a typical non-of-
fender, then it seems the offender would not be less of a
free agent than the non-offender [15].8 Nevertheless, the
offender’s belief that the forcible injection of a mind-
altering drug would pose a causal threat to agency might
result in great distress. This supports the harm-based
objection against such forcible injections, discussed pre-
viously. It might be argued that officials could relieve
this distress by explaining to offenders that the injection
would not undermine any of the capacities required for
free decision-making. However, in reality, if one were
faced with the prospect of being forced to undergo a
medical procedure that would alter one’s own thought-
processes, even rational arguments about the benign
nature of such interventions are still unlikely to be very
reassuring.
Perhaps the most significant problemwithmandatory
injection of prisoners is that it poses a communicative
threat to agency. Pinning someone down and forcibly
injecting her with a mind-altering drug is likely to send
out a more disrespectful message about that individual
than incarceration would. Violating bodily (and mental)
integrity sends out a disrespectful message, because it
invades a particularly intimate sphere. The individual’s
body and mind are constitutive of the person and
invading the mind and body therefore amounts to a
fundamental attack on the person, in a way that
interfering with free movement does not (Shaw, 2016,
Against the mandatory use of neurointerventions in
criminal sentencing. in Birks, D. & Douglas, T. (eds),
Treatment for crime: Philosophical essays on neuro-
interventions in criminal justice. Oxford University
Press, unpublished).9
The claim that interfering with bodily integrity is
particularly disrespectful is supported by the fact that
society has historically moved away from physical pun-
ishment of adults (and, as noted above, of children),
preferring constraints on free movement such as impris-
onment (or in the case of children grounding, or deten-
tion). Admittedly, as Douglas claims, killing, torture and
public humiliation are even greater threats to agency
than the kind of forcible injection under discussion. A
closer analogy with forcible injection might be non-
public flogging of moderate intensity that does not
inflict serious physical injuries. If such flogging is less
acceptable than even long-term incarceration (as our
legal system assumes) this suggests a similar basis for
preferring incarceration to forcibly administered injec-
tions. It might be objected that the problemwith the kind
of flogging just described is the distress it inflicts rather
than the disrespect it communicates. However, it is far
from clear that such flogging would necessarily inflict
more distress than long-term incarceration, even under
good prison conditions. Arguably, the forced injection
with a mind-altering drug would even involve an addi-
tional kind of disrespect that is not present in the flog-
ging example [16]. The injection sends out the message
that the offender’s moral motivation is so deficient that it
needs to be directly re-engineered. In contrast, flogging
engages the offender’s agency as it is—either by pro-
viding him with a prudential reason to refrain from
reoffending, if it is administered as a deterrent, or by
responding in a retributive way to his free choice to do
wrong. It is also worth noting that many considered the
forced psychiatric treatment of dissidents in the former
Soviet Union to be particularly sinister—wrong in a
distinctive way—when compared with incarceration.
Compulsory treatment was not sinister purely because
of the distress it inflicted, but because it showed utter
contempt for the dissident’s status as an agent.
Douglas claims that an action only poses a communi-
cative threat to agency if it reflects contemptuous attitudes
held by the person who performs that action. However,
this is an overly subjective interpretation of themeaning of
actions. Actions have a social meaning that is to some
extent independent of the personal motives of the individ-
ual who performs the action. To return to the flogging
analogy, an official responsible for administering flog-
gings might not deny that offenders are moral agents.
He might personally view flogging as a way of commu-
nicating moral censure to a responsible agent who freely
chose to do wrong and who (the official believes) will
8 It might be argued that suddenness of the change in preferences
and their disconnection from the agent’s previous motivational set-
up would undermine agency. In response, as I have argued else-
where, individuals who undergo road to Damascus experiences
suddenly alter their preferences while retaining their agency. The
chemical origin of the change in preferences does not necessarily
undermine agency either. If, for instance, natural, non-pathological
changes in brain chemistry, as a person ages, result in a somewhat
decreased desire to engage in violent or risky behaviour we would
not consider this a threat to agency [16].
9 This is a reason to object to interferences with both bodily and
mental integrity. In addition, there are further reasons why inter-
fering specifically with mental integrity would be disrespectful,
because it involves changing the agent’s mind without engaging
with the agent’s existing mental capacities. See[16] p13 and [15],
p73. However, there is not scope within the present article discuss
the issue of mental integrity in depth, because the article primarily
focuses on Douglas’s arguments about the right to bodily integrity.
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understand the message of censure being communicated.
He need not, personally, be contemptuous of prisoners.
Perhaps he thinks that they faced strong temptations or
pressures that he himself might have succumbed to had he
been in their position and, if that had been the case, he
would have been willing to be flogged himself. Yet this
official’s personal views would not prevent flogging from
communicating a disrespectful message about the
offender. 10
Social meanings can of course change. If such a
change occurred with regard to the forcible injection of
offenders, one might think that it was acceptable at that
point to engage in this practice. However, it is difficult to
imagine that Bre-education^ alone would effect such
change. This change would, as noted above, represent
a reversal of the historical trend away from using state-
sanctioned interference with bodily integrity as a way of
enforcing social/legal conformity. The fact that non-
consensual interference with bodily integrity typically
communicates disrespect is unlikely to be an arbitrary
convention. Gardner and Shute give the example of a
woman who is raped while unconscious and suffers no
adverse physical effects and never discovers what has
happened to her [17]. What makes this rape still seri-
ously wrong is the fact that it treats the victim with
profound disrespect. This point is not confined to rape.
Imagine a similar scenario where skilful surgeons per-
form a procedure on an anaesthetised patient despite
knowing the patient would not consent to the particular
procedure that had been carried out. This still seems
disrespectful even if it posed no risk of negative physical
consequences and the victim never discovers what hap-
pened. The disrespect involved in these cases does not
seem to be the result of an arbitrary convention. The law
could not change the meaning of these actions in the
way that it could change road traffic rules, which are
merely conventional. The disrespect involved in these
cases is much more extreme than similar interferences
with freedom of movement. Imagine locking someone
in a room while they are asleep, without causing phys-
ical harm and without the Bvictim^ ever discovering that
this had been done. It might be objected that the reason
why the examples involving non-consensual interfer-
ence with bodily integrity communicate more disrespect
than the example of the locked room is that the former is
a greater violation of the individuals’ preferences –
greater because the preferences are stronger. However,
this objection would be question begging, because the
greater intensity of the preferences arguably reflects the
more serious view we take towards violating bodily
integrity, compared with infringing free movement. Al-
ternatively advocates of mandatory injections may pro-
pose implementing this practice first as a means of
changing the attitudes towards it. If this approach were
taken then administering forcible injections during a
period when attitudes were still opposed or transitioning
would risk violating the rights of individuals treated
during this period. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
changing attitudes to the mandatory injection of of-
fenders would be desirable. It is difficult to imagine
altering such attitudes in a compartmentalised fashion.
Eroding the significance of the right to bodily integrity
in the context of injecting offenders carries a high risk of
eroding the significance accorded to that right in other
contexts as well, which might have adverse unintended
consequences.
To summarise: In this section, I have discussed two
considerations that could provide a basis for a) the claim
that the right to bodily integrity is more robust than the
right to free movement and hence a basis for b) the
practice of requiring that offenders give consent before
medical interventions are permissible, while still impos-
ing incarceration on a mandatory basis. These consider-
ations are that interfering with bodily integrity (through
medical interventions) can cause more harm than inter-
fering with free movement (through incarceration) and
that the former can also pose a greater communicative
threat to agency than the latter—i.e. communicates a
message of disrespect for agency. I have argued that
there is more reason for taking the harm consideration
seriously than Douglas acknowledges. However, the
more significant consideration, in my view, is the com-
municative threat to agency that I have argued would
arise from mandatory medical treatment of offenders.
Conclusion
Douglas has highlighted an issue of great theoretical
interest and practical significance. There is widespread
academic acceptance of the proposition that mandatory
incarceration of offenders is acceptable, while mandato-
ry medical rehabilitation is unacceptable. However, the
moral basis for this position has not been thoroughly
10 This assumes that the fact that the offender had been sentenced
to flogging was not kept secret. Keeping sentences secret would
raise a host of ethical concerns.
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examined. If the current position were not well founded
then that would have important implications for the
criminal justice system. Douglas has mounted a very
thought-provoking challenge to the current consensus.
In this article, I have attempted to raise some doubts
about this challenge. I do not claim to have provided a
complete defence of the current stance regarding man-
datory medical treatment versus mandatory incarcera-
tion. It is to be hoped that more work will be done in this
area in the future [18].
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